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Introduc tion
There is far more to population than economics. The existence of
any person now is the result of one chance in eomltless billions of possibilities
down the ages so, by this test, the value of a person is immeasurably great
whatever her or his social status, though this may not appear about ourselves
or to us about our fellow humans, there are so many of us. The existence of
a person will usually create love and other social relations of incomparable
significance. We are aware that in Law and in less worthy connections
(including kidnapping) the question of valuation of a person can arise; figures
are mentioned but they cannot be regarded seriously as statistics. At one time
in Ireland* long ago the argument was rife in respectable circles that because
it cost £1,000 to rear an emigrant the country lost £20 million a year if emigration
amounted to 20,000 persons. R. C. Geary’s (1941) refutation of this thesis is
nowadays as likely to amuse as to instruct. You may hold that human existence
is always better than non-existence, a philosophical question which shall not
concern us.
Our approach is almost exclusively statistical. We bear in mind,
however, the peroration of Selan Lemass at the Centenary Banquet in 1947 of the
SSIST. "The best things in life are not measurable by statistics and we pray
that they will remain so". We mention non-statistical values lest they be
forgotten. Population policy may be determined by such values, despite any
statistical showing; this is for the people to determine. There may be no such
conflict.
During the past 200 years the Irish diaspora has almost equalled that
of the Jews, our population level dominated by emigration which has had the
* The labour force forecasts in this paper x~ ere based on estimates of the actual
¯ labour force that have been significantly revised for earlier years to ensure
consistency with data for recer, t ,years. For the adjusted historical series, the
reader is referred to J.J. Sexton "The Changing Labour Force", in The Irish
Economy and Society in the 1980s, Dublin: ESRI, 1981.
Qimportmlt abiding result of a population of Irish origin throughout the world
immensely greater than the home population: a European monk, Strabo, in
the 9th century referred to "the Irish habit of going away" (Waddell, 1933).    If
this "going away" be an ingrained instinct of the people we must be slow to condemn
it out of hand as always ’"oad", as was usually the case in the past, but rather to
determine what the national outlook should be in future, given the relevant
conditions at home and abroad. B. M. Walsh (1968) has shown that variations in
the movement in the period 1952-68 were dominated by relative economic conditions
.
(comparative unemployment and wage levels) in Ireland and UK. An open mind
will be necessary about the problem of migration, in as well as out. The virtual
cessation of net emigration since 1961 is to be welcomend as a very positive
indication of the strength of the economic upsurge that started about 1960
and as showing our young people’s realisation that a good livelihood can be had
in Ireland.
By interllational comparison there was nothing very remarkable about
the Irish birth and death rates during the past 150 years. Before 1960, however,
the Irish marriage rate was very low told but slowly increasing. A tenable
hypothesis would be that the low marriage rate was partly related to the economic
level and the propensity to emigrate, i.e., as indicating unsettlement amongst
young people as to where their future would lie, marriage implying employment,
a settling down.
With a normal birth rate and low marriage rate in the past, births per
marriage in Ireland during most of the past century were very high by comparison
with other countries in western Europe. There were also the facts that in these
countries (including Ireland) (i) number of births was always well below the biological
maximum and(ii)the number of birthswas always of the same order of magnitude as the
number of deaths, de spite the faet of a birth and a death being almost independent,
See Keenan (1981) for a detailed discussion of this and the subsequent literature
on the determinants of migration.
.of one another*. Does each community in some sense require a more or less
determinate number of births, as a law of population? R. C. Geary (1935) found
that (i) with countries as units there was an inverse relationship between the
marriage rate and the birth rate and (ii) with Irish comities as traits a similar
result. These relationships.were found using data of half a century ago and we
are not concerned with their being true today or then, except to remark that they
do not disprove a law of something like self-regulation in the matter of population.
A question arises "Is there any point in policy?" For example, if family pimming
reduces children per marriage from four (imaginary) to two will number of
marriages double, and, if so, what point is there in trying to regulate population
size in a democratic society?
¯ . ,,
One cites a paper of 1935 with some trepidation nowadays - another popular
myth of the time that it dispelled was that "the bullock drove the people from the
land" - but listen:-
"It would be an inestimable advantage if population could be
forecast even within wide limits of error. These forecasts
are really implicit in all long-term fixed capital investment,
including building of all kinds (universities, schools, factories,
shops, as well as private dwelling schemes); investment in
industrial and commercial enterprises; construction of roads
and drainage works, etc. For the purpose of public administration
these figures would be most useful, for example in connection with
the provision to be made for old age and other public pension
schemes. The extent to which government would be justified hi
in embarking on long-term investment (perhaps with the intention
of relieving present-day distress), or "mortgaging the future"
as the saying goes, must depend to a considerable extent on the
anticipated size of the population.
Mention of schools and old age pensions brings to mind the
necessity of forecasting not only total population but also its
break-up into age groups and sexes, which has also an important
bearing on the problem of estimating the future earning power of
the population as indicated say by the proportion of males between
the ages of 15 and 65 and the burden of dependency as indicated by
the proportion of population outside of these ages".
Not bad at all as a prescription for the present paper’
* h~ fact connected only by large birth rates being related to high infant mortality.
**
The UN Fourth Inquiry among Govermnents in developed countries as to their
perceptions Of the consequences of current rates of natural increase indicated
that of 40 countries surveyed 11 felt that a higher rate was desirable, 28 were
satisfied with the current rate and only one (Turkey) felt that a lower rate was
desirable, and that of the 11 countries that desired a higher rate of natural
increase, 7 pursued policies ~hat.sought to increase fertility. UN (1979)
oIn our preliminary study of authority we found elaborate analysis of
dubious statistical data and subtle theoretical reasoning bearing oll our topic,
most resulting (when there was a result) in conclusions which could be derived by
good sense or common knowledge. For example, the simple answer, requiring
no analysis, to Malthus’ so well known theory of destruction is that it didn’t
happen; necessarily it was that prophet’s misfortune that far wiser thought of
his was ignored, to the detriment of demographic--economic theory, resulting
from Ricardo’s taking over. Even nowadays, however, there may be some truth
in Malthus as applied to poorer countries.
We shall be concerned with the three great age groups, 0-14, 15-64, 65 +,
i. e., children, working, retired, approximately, the middle group supporting the
other two, meaning that the output of the middle group must be enough not only for
themselves but for the other two groups as well; of course they must support their
own ill and unemployed. This is the problem of dependency, the ratio of sum of
first and third to the second being very high in Ireland, as we shall see. While,
as already remarked, number of births is of the same order of magnitude as number
of deaths, the former always exceeds the latter in Ireland (as in most modern
communities), the excess being the natural increase; when the latter exceeds net
emigration the population increases.
The outstanding fact of humanity is that, despite the lack of explicit relationship
between births, deaths and effort to obtain the wherewithal for life, in every age
the majority of people have succeeded in obtaining a living if not at a generally high
level and that, in the more advanced countries, i.e., those for which it has been
possible to make reliable estimates, the material standard of living has markedly
increased as well as the population itself, as we shall see: so much for Malthus in
these countries~ Well may religious people exclaim from the showing of Table 3
"The Lord above will provide".
We shall first consider the main features of the recent demographic
and economic trends in Ireland, on occasion with recourse to international comparison.
The demographic treatment wilt culminate in estimates of the population in the
future census years 1991 and 2001. We shall regard our main object in examining
trends in the recent past as enabling extrapolations of populations in education,
agriculture, industry, services as well as likely trends in number of marriages.
In aggregate these extrapolations (probabiy with implicit large recourse to ranges
of figures) will be compared with the aforementioned estimates of population in
A.D. 1991 and 2001. Differences between the former (aggregates) and the tatter
(estimates) must be accounted for by migration and/or tmemploymeat. This
approach will also permit an examination of the few forecasts made by others. We
would hope that our investigation generally would help towards the formulation of
a middle-term socio-economic plan for Ireland, with an eye to the constraint, mostly
financial, on progress.
Scepticism has often been expressed about the usefulness of plmming ’
.
and forecasting, in view of the uncertainty. It is quite true that great unforeseeable
changes are certain to occur in the twenty years to our time horizon. We are
always prone to think that no times ever changed so rapidly as ours at present°
Despite these changes there has always been a great stability in the Irish macros -
see, for instance, the small changes over tong time periods in most of the series
in Table A1. Good plans can be made from quite rough forecasts; with determination
and wide acceptance by the public the plans will be largely self-fulfillhlg. At its
lowest, exercises like the present force us to think about the future, surely a
good in itself.
International comparison of population
With no further preamble we plunge in medias res with Table i, of recent
comparable European statistics.
r
Table 1
However, see Norton (1975) for a full discussion of planning and policy formation
and the technical constraints irdlerent therein.
oThere is no need to stress the sensational character of this table. Ireland’s
birthrate was largest in 1975, the only rate that had not declined since 1960,
though a small fall has been recorded in the net reproduction rate (NRR): this is the
number of females who will survive to reproduce, per female infant bo’m now.
The poorer countries on the roster are those with the higher birth rates, and NiXies
and the declines have been the more rapid generally in the fifteen year period the
wealthier the country. Most remarkable is the case of the German Federal Republic,
the rates for which have nearly halved. Even France, which for more than a
century has been the most vigorous propagandist for les familles nombreuses,
has not been able to maintain its rates.
Table 2
No details are given in the source of Table 2 as to the methods used for
forecasting populations. They are stated to be from official sources; also
"where several projections based on different assumptions are available that in
which the assumptions come most closely to current trends has been taken". We
are not surprised to notice smaller anticipated increases for the more prosperous
countries, which are likely to remain the more prosperous. The expected trends
in the populations aged 15-44 are given for the relevance of these to inter-Europeun
migration. Ireland is not represented in Table 2 but it may be stated that from
data to be discussed the anticipated percentage increases (assuming migration nil
and birth rate 21) during the twenty-fiveyear period 1975-2000 will be about 32
for the whole population and 53 for the population aged 15-44. These percentages
are much higher than any in the last column of Table 2. In recent years Ireland
has experienced net immigration so that an assumption of net migration nil in
the near future is by no means implausible.
Assuming that integration of Europe continues during the next twenty
years(notmerely formally but in reality) there must be an increasing tendency to
"migrate towards more prosperous eentres and, to repeat, we expect the present
emore prosperous countries to remain so, relatively. There will be no objection
to entry for jobs provided there are vacancies but, in the recent past in. the more
affluent countries, entry was to inferior jobs that’natives did not want and such
limitation in future will appeal less and less to fellow-Europeans, least of all to
the Irish, with an almost unequalled experience of emigration, the worst feature
of which was lack of skill of emigrants. The latter forced Irish immigrants in.to
the lowest and poorest paid jobs in the principal countries of immigration, USA
and Britain. Status inferiority lasted even into the second generation of Irish in
USA. Irish emigration to USA has been. small since the depression of the 1930s
and indications now are that people of Irish origin are fully integrated jobwise in
the USA. The main lesson from the past is that fll future most Irish people seeking
work abroad should have acquired a skill before they go. With a trade or a
profession there should be little difference in employment anywhere for anyone,
with improved ease of travel and communication the distinction between voluntary
and compulsory emigration vanishing as we become more consciously and acceptably
citizens of Europe. We must also become receptive towards other Europeans
coming to jobs in Ireland.
The normal condition for Ireland during the past two ceaturies was of
high unemployment and emigration rates. Population in the past never adjusted
itself to these conditions. For most o~ the time the indications were of national
over-population, though the population was small in relation to the area of fl~e
cotmtry, by Europeml standards. The situation as regards emigration, however,
was probably never as tragic as it was politically represented to be; it was true,
as indeed one politician got into trouble ~or so expressing [t even after independence,
"emigration is part of the Irish system", so much so, hldeed, that as recently as
twenty-five years ago three out of five youngsters aged 14 emigrated and probably
all children considered emigration as a possibility some time. It was more natural
\
for children in rural areas to go to a job in Liverpool (later, as to Boston earlier)
where they had friends and relations than to go to Dublin. Yes, emigration was
Table 1: Birth and net reproduction rates In certain European countries, 1960 to 1975
__ Country 1960    1965 1970 1975 1960 1965 1970 1975
Birth rate Net reproduction rate
Austria 17.9 17.9 15.2 12.5
Belgium 17.0 16.5 14.8 12.2
Denmark 16.6 18.0 14.4 14.2
France 17.9 17.8 16.8 14.1
Germany, F.R. 17.4 17.7 13.4 9.7
Greece 18.9 17.7 16.5 15.7
Ireland 21.5 22. 1 21.9 21.5
Italy 17.9 18.8 16.5 14.8
l~etherlands 20.8 19.9 18.3 13.0
Norway 17.3 17.8 16.6 14. I
Portugal 23.7 23.0 19. I 19. I
Spain 21.6 21.1 19.5 18.9
Sweden 13.7 15.9 13.7 12.7
Switzerland 17.6 18.8 15.8 12.3
United Kingdom 17.5 18.4 16.3 12.5
I. 19 I. 24 I. 07 0.91
1.19 I. 22 I. 06 0.87
1.20 1.23 0.93 0.92
1.28 1.34 1.18 0.92
I.I0 1.18 0.95 0.68
1.00 I. 05 1.12 I. 07
1.80 1.85 1.81 1.67
I. 07 I. 21 I.II 1.02
I. 46 I. 43 I. 22 0.79
1.33 1.37 1.19 0.95
1.40 1.38 1.39 I. 27
I. 24 I. 35 I. 35 n.a.
I. 02 I. 15 0.92 0.85
1.15 I. 23 I. 00 0.76
I. 26 i.35 1.15 0.85
Source: Council of Europe. Recent demographic developments In the member states of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1978
Note:
The 1975 rates shown for Ireland are slightb~ higher than those shown in Tab!e _41 due to upward revision of the 1978
Population estimate after the 1979 Census.
Table 2: Projections of populab:on to year 2000 in certain European countries, total and ages 15-44
Millions
Country 1975     1980     1985     1990     1995     2000 1975/2000 % Change
Total PopuIation
Belgiuni
Denmark
France
Germany, F.R.
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
9.79 9.83 9.84 9.89 9.94 9.97 1.8
5.05 5.12 5.19 5.24 5.29 5.31 5.1
52.60 53.60 54.83 56.09 57.26 58.24 10.7
61.99 60.76 59.61 58.59 57.47 55.94 -9.8
8.99 9.25 9.48 9.70 9.92 10.15 12.9
55.65 56.34 57.08 57.83 n.a. 5.9*
13.60 13.90 14.25 14.65 14.99 15.22 11.9
9.63 9.97 10.27 10.52 n.a. 13.1"
35.34 37.26 39.05 40.64 41.95 n.a. 23.0*
55.98 55.90 56.16 56.84 57.57 58.00 3.6
Pooulation aged 15-44
Belgium 4.03 4.21 4.34 4.45 4.32 4.17 3.5
Denmark 2. II 2.21 2.31 2.31 2.22 2.18 3.3
France 22.06 22.91 23.89 24.96 24.45 24.26 I0.0
Germany, F.E. 26.09 26.79 26.58 25.33 24.34 23.15 -11.3
Greece 3.72 3.76 3.89 4.06 4.12 4.15 11.6
Italy 23.07 23.47 24.08 24.67 n.a. I0.3*
Ne~erlands 5.96 6.39 6.76 6.87 6.57 6.41 7.6
Portugal 4.02 4.25 4.46 4.68 n.a. 25.6*
Spain 14.65 15.38 16.46 17.43 18.22 n.a. 30.0*
United Kingdom 22.06 23.36 24.43 24.75 23.87 23.86 8.2
* estimated
Source: Eurosh~t. S%atistlcal office of the European Communities, 1980.
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largelyan accepted practice in Ireland. It cannot, and should not, be ruled
out in future, under certain conditions.
We assume that our freedom implies that the interest of the individual
in Ireland will be paramount, as distinct from any claim of State or even of family.
Of course there are constraints on her or his liberty but, within these constraints
or in spite of them, the judgment of the individual about his or her interest will
be final, as to choice of place of work. The relevance of the foregoing remarks
is that (at this introductory stage) we cannot envisage maintenance of the Irish
birth rate at more or less present levels without fairly substmltiai emigration.
This hypothesis wilt be examined later. Well-prepared young people working
anywhere may become a valuable asset of the nation.
To repeat what we said earlier, the outstanding fact of the human
condition is that, despite the lack of relationship between births and deaths,
mid effort to obtain a livelihood, in every age the majority of people have succeeded
in obtaining a living. In the more advanced countries, which naturally
happen to be those for which actual figures or estimates of population and income
over a long period in the past are available - see Table 3 due to Simon Kuzn.ets -
the material standard of living has markedly increased as well
as the population itself. While in these countries learning (and all that this
implies) has manifestly defeated his prophesy of doom, Malthus’s theory wilt
continue to rule in a large part of the world (in which it is estimated there are
one billion people, or one quarter of the world population, hungary) unless mid
until the more affluent parts (including Ireland) substantially improve on their
present wretched levels of aid.
Table 3
The comparable figures for Ireland in the lengthy periods sho~rn in
Table 3 are not available. From our appendix Table.A1, giving basic data for
the post-war period the following calculations have been. made:-
Table 3:
11.
Population growth and output growth per head over (1) a centuz~y
and (2) a half century
Country Period
(1) Century
Population
growth rate
per decade
Output per head
growth rate per
decade
Frmloe 1861-70 to 1963-66 3.0 17.0
Sweden 1861-69 to 1963-67 6.6 28.9
Great Britain 1855-64 to 1963-67 8.2 13.4
Norway 1865-69 to 1963-67 8.3 21.3
Denmark 1865-69 to 1963-67 10.2 20.2
Germany 1850-59 to 1963-67 10.8 18.3
Japan 1874-79 to 1963-67 12.1 32.3
Netherlands 1860-70 to 1963-67 13.4 12.6
United States 1859 to 1963-67 18.7 17.3
Canada 1870-74 to 1963-67 19.0 18.7
Australia 1861-69 to 1963-67 23.7 10.2
(2) Half Century
France 1896    to 1963-66 3.5 18.6
Great Britain 1920-24 to 1963-67 4.8 16.9
Belgium 1900-04 to 1963-67 5.3 14.3
Italy 1895-99 to 1963-67 6.9 22.9
Switzerland 1910    to 1963-67 10.4 20.5
Netherlands 1900-09 to 1963-67 14.2 15.1
United States 1910-14 to 1963-67 14.2 18.4
Australia 1900--04 to 1963-67 18.8 13.1
Canada 1920-24 to 1963-67 19.4 20.9
Source: Simon (1977) in which it is stated the data derive from S. Kuznets’ Economic
growth of nations, Harvard University Press, 1971.
12.
Percentage
’ 
changes per decade in population and real GNP per head in Ireland
1947-1960 and 1960-1978
Population
¯ GNP per head
1947-I960                    1960-1978
-3.8              9.1
28.1 33.8
A remarkable feature of Table 3 is the comparative constancy in
growth rates in output per head compared to growth rates in population: in the
half-century the range in the former was 14-21 while the increase in population
range was 3~-19~. As regards Ireland, it may come as some surprise that the
increase in real GNP per head was not so very different in the two periods before
and after 1960, whereas the difference in population changes were enormous -
from a decadal fall of 4 per cent to an increase of 9 per cent. We may add that,
as is almost self-evident, there is no correlation in either period of Table 3
between population and output per head growth.
\
Is there a law of population adjustment ?
. r
In an ahnost purely statistical paper like this one must be on one’s
guard against mystical speculations, impossible of proof. Yet, as suggested
earlier, the inference from Table 3 and our Irish addendum is irresistible that
in modem communities population adjusts itself in some way to a desired level
of material wellbeing or vice versa, if in a mysterious way.
If this were fully true there would be lit±le point in considering a policy for
population or the economy, and policy implies intervention of govermnent. During
the long periods of Table 3 there was but little involvement of government; the
same is true of postwar Ireland. France was the only population-conscious
country in the past but the result of prodigious effort was negligible and economic
plans everywhere have fallen into disrepute, unfortunately so. In our econometric
opinion the plans were not good enough.
These mystical speculations might seem to imply that of their own
accord populations and economies will adapt to one another automatically.    So,
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to repeat a question, what is the point of this paper? The answer is: if true,
these are average findings wifl] enormous variation in wellbeing and the lot of
the disadvm{taged will not improve automatically; the gap between rich and poor
is widening within countries and between countries; and even a good situation can
always be made better by intelligent effort in the light of information.
The tendency towards a constant number of births even with an increased
number of marriages referred to earlier may be operating at present in Ireland.
Between the census years 1971 and 1979, eight years only, number of married
women aged 15-44 increased from 274,000 to 365,000 or by 33 per cent, while
births to such women increased from 65,400 to 68,900, or by only 5 per cent,
indicating an unprecedented decline in fertility of marriage. Age-specific fertility
rates in these two years are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Births per 100 married women aged 15-44, 1971 and 1979
Age of married women Fertility rate
1971 1979
Percentage
decline
Under 20 68.2 54.3 20.4
20-24 45.9 34.3 25.3
25-29 35.1 27.5 21.6
30-34 24.9 19.6 21.4
35-39 16.1 10.8 33.0
40-44 5.9 3.5 39.9
Total 23.9 18.9 21.0
Basic source: Census of Population 1971, 1979; Report on Vital Statistics
The uniformity of decline amongst younger women will be noted. The greater
declines in the two older groups are just what would be expected if the thesis of
inverse relationship between marriage and fertility rates obtained.
Future Population
Before considering estimates of future population, some remarks
on basic Table A1. The rates shown have been revised to take account of the
revisions in intercensal population estimates for 1972-1978 consequent on the
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census of 1979. The most remarkable features of the table are -
" the change in trend in total population in 1961 from mild decline to emphatic
increase;
" the constmmy of the birthrate, despite
° the increase in the marriage rate from about 5.5 for many years to 7.4 in each
of the years 1971-1973, or by 35 per cent;
the persistent decline in the crude death rate to less than 10 per thousand in
1979, resulting in an increase in the rate of natural increase from 9.0 in 1946
to 11.8 in 1979;
¯ the changeover in net migration from substantially ou_._~t during 1949-1961, to less
substantially but persistently ~ during the years 1972-1979 with an interregnum
of mild emigration between these periods;
¯ the persistent increase in real Gi~ per head over the whole period and not only
since the resurgence of 1960;
¯ also the persistence of the percentage out of work, apparently tmaffected by
the economic upsurge.
While file last inference is formally true, it is a fact that the total of unemployment
emigration (with immigration minus) has improved substantially. The
correlation between real GNP per head and the marriage rate is . 81 which,
with 30 d.f, is highly significant.
Fundamental for our inquiry will be estimates of population for
near future census years which we take as 1991 and 2001. It is unnecessary to
warn about the hazardous character of these estimates which in the past have been
falsified in every country that has tried them. In Table 5 forecasts are based on
the assumption of migration nil. They are means to an end, and not an end in
themselves, as will appear. They are designed to enable us to discuss levels
of labour force, unemployment, migration, education, capital requirements etc.,
15.
in fact economic and social policy, with some approach to reality.
Our method of estimation is simple which, we hope, will not be
regarded as naive. Usually for such work demographers take into accomlt
marriage rates, fertility rates, birth, deafl~ and migration rates, and assume
changes in these during the forecasting period. These methods involve several
.
assumptions all likely to prove wrong.    We decided to base our estimates on
the fewest possible assumptions. They are most likely to be wrong at ages
under 20. For these we assume a narrow range of birth rates, this because despite
the great increase in the marriage rate in recent years the birfll rate has remained
almost constant over the whole postwar period - see Table A1. We assume
unchanged death rates at every age in using survivorship rates derived from the
1970-72 Life Table at each quinquennial age group, summarised to four major
age groups.
Table 5
The assumption with regard to the birth rate does not make much
difference to the total population estimate between 1979 and 2001. Attention is
confined to the case of migration zero, so that the estimates for 1991 and 2001
**
purport to relate to the Irish wherever they reside. Starting always with the same
population, namely, 3.4million in 1979, with no emigration the figure in 2001 would reach
4.3 million (assuming the continuance of a presentday birth rate of 21).
One of Ireland’s gravest demographic problems is its high dependency
ratio, namely the ratio of the number of those aged 0-14 and 65 and over to the
number aged 15-64. The figure of 0. Y0 for Ireland in 1979 compares as follows
with those for other European countries:-
Basic sourc e:
Austria 0.61 Netherlands 0.55
Belgium 0.56 Norway 0.60
Denmark 0.56 Portugal 0.61
France 0.59 Spain 0.60
Germany, F.I~. 0.55 Sweden 0.57
Greece 0.57 Switzerland 0.53
Italy 0.57 United Kingdom 0.59
Council of Europe (1978)
Walsh (1980) warns of "... Hie tendency of models to be dominated by historical
** trends and not to anticipate turning points ..."
i.e., Irish born after 1979 plus survivors of those alive in Ireland in 1979 wherever born.
T able 5. Estimated population in 1991 and 2001, in four age groups on the assumption of migration
zero and of three constant birthrates; comparative figures for 1979; percentage
distributions and dependency ratios
Birthrate per I, 000 population
Age 21.5 20          1 21 22
i
1979 1991 2001 [ 1991 2001     1991 2001
Thousand
0 -14
15-44
45 -64
65-
1029.9
1381.1
595.9
361.4
3368.2
1060 1150
1760 1980
620 750
380 360
3820 49.24_0
II00 1220
1760 1990
620 750
380 360
Total
Percentage
0 -14
15-44
45 -64
65-
3860 4320
1140 1290
1760 2010
620 750
380 360
3900 4420
30.6
41.0
17.7
10.7
28 27
46 47
16 18
I0 8
28 28
48 46
16 17
I0 8
29 29
45 46
16 17
I0 8
0. 704 0.61
Dependency ratio
0.55 0.62 0.58 0.64 0.60
17.
The present Irish dependency level is a severe burden, for expenditure on education
and social security, oll ournot-rich com~try. Ceteris paribus Ireland’s 0.70 means
that we have to devote a quarter more of our resources to dependency than a country
with a ratio of 0.55 which means so much less for capital expenditurel since little
of social security payment is saved. Table 5 shows, however, that, with migration
.
zerojthe Irish ratio would decline to present European levels by the year 2001.
Our approach in this paper will now be seen to be first a setting-out of
basic demographic data, to form some idea of the trend in population in the near
future. Our main problem is seen to be: how will this population adapt itself to
this future? In Geary and Dempsey (1977) it was strongly urged that the endemic
Irish unemployment problem should be tackled directly, i.e., as many as possible
people seeking jobs should be placed in jobs in Ireland. The process, it was argued,
could not be left to the automatic working of the economic process, as is predominantly
the case at present. It was recogaised that this procedure would not result ill an
optimal GNP and that it would be far better if the economic process could be relied
on to set the people to work. The choice is likely to be the familiar one of the lesser
of two evils. It will be for the people to decide, consciously or in their instinctive
reaction. Will recovery from the present depression still result in substantial
unemployment and emigration as was normal in the past? Will maintenance of our
birth rate at more or less present levels, and hence far higher than that of our EEC
partners and other advanced cotmtries result in a great demand abroad for Irish
labour? If so, should we not prepare our potential emigrants?
. Consideration to the year 2001 would be regarded as middle term though
we cannot be indifferent to the short term en route thereto: c’est le premier pas qui
comPte.    So we have sedulously sought out plans, global or hi the main sectors,
ttowever the Irish dependency ratio will still exceed those [n most EEC countries.
t~r’ojecteddependency ratios for EEC countries, where available, are Belgium: 0.52;
Denmark: 0.51; France: 0.55; Germany: 0.46; Netherlands: 0.50; and United Kingdom:
0.57.
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prepared by others, incIuding any plans of the political parties. We would have hoped
to describe these plans, and to comment on them in the light of demographic, and
economic analyses. We thought that there must be many such public and
private plans if only because every capital action implies some vision or assumption
about the future. We hoped to deal systematically, if briefly, with such matters
as education, agriculture, industry, the services, major aspects of capital
investment. The population aspect would predominate in this consideration.
We were disappointed in our search for middle term plans, i.e., schemes
in sufficient detail to be worthy of the name, instead of vague political aspirations
.
which in any case are short term. It is true that plmming has fallen into disrepute
but (we believe) this was mainly because the plans were teclmically faulty;
the need was ignored of keeping the plans constantly under review and modifying
them as the need required in a changing environme~xt. Efforts should be directed
toward improving plans, not abandoning the approach. To repeat, every hxdividuat
or group making an investment has some plan of the near future in mind, [. e., plans
exist at the micro levei. To make these consistent with one another there should
be a macro or master plan (or plans for major sectors) and efforts made to keep
to it so that it would be almost self-fulfilling.
Table 6
Table 6 is the first step in the transition from population to labour force,
a term ide~tical with "gainfully occupied" of the census, which includes numbers
out of work. Main features of the trend are:-
* the fail in the percentage gainfully occupied, very marked in the last interval
1971-1979
¯ the great increase in the percentage hi education from 4 in 1951 to 10 in 1979;
the regular h~crease hi number and percentage of married women not gainfully
occupied.
]Despite the marked increase in the total told percentage not ga~fully occupied, the
residual class of males and single females declined from 13 per cent in 1951 to
10 per eo~t in 1971 and 1979.
Since this was written an ESRI Conference on "The Irish Economy and Society
in’the 1980s" has taken place (October 1981). We have made a summary of the
six papers presented to this Col~erence, which will be made available to any
one who asks for it.
Table 6: Population aged 14 or over gainfully occupied and not gainfully occupied in certain classes; 1951 to 1979, with percentages
Category                                 1951               1961           1966             1971               1 979
Thousand
Gainfully occupied 1272.0 1108.1 II18.2 1119.5 1219
Not gainfully occupied 886.5 890.5 920.7 985.8 1188
in education 81.3 116.5 143.0 186.1 250
Not in education 805.2 774.0 777.7 799.7 938
Males 109.1 116.6 115.2 122.9 144e
Females 696.1 657.5 662.5 676.7 794
Married and widowed 532.6 537.3 560.7 588 ¯ 4 694e
Single 163.5 120.2 I01.8 88.3 I00e
Percentage of population aged 14 +
Ga~_fu[Iy occupied 58.9 55.4 54.8 53.2 50.6
Not gainfully occupied 41.1 44.6 45.2 46.8 49.4
In education 3.8 5.8 7.0 8.8 10.4
Not in education 37.3 38.7 38.1 38.0 39.0
Males 5.1 5.8 5.7 5.8 6.0e
Females 32.2 32.9 32.5 32.1 33.0
Married and widowed 24.7 26.9 27.5 27.9 28.8e
Single 7.6 6.0 5.0 4.2 4.2e
Basic sources: Censuses of population;
(1978/79).
e: Estimated
Trend of Employment and Unemployment; DepartmenL of Education Statistical Report
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We shall be concerned with trends in numbers in education and numbers
of married women in considering how numbers in these categories reconcile with
population forecasts in 1991 m~d 2001.
Diagram 1 illustrates in detail of year the main showing of Table 6, but
in relation to total population.
Diagram 1
The regularity in the decline in the labour force percentage is evident, from about
43 in 1953 to 37½ in 1979, the latter percentage being almost unchanged for a period
of five or six years. Table 6 has shown that increases in post-primary education
and in the number of married women, both groups mainly outside the labour force,
explain, or explain away, this decline; the phenomenon is important, however,
since it is the labour force which must support the whole population.
The macro economic trend
We now consider recent demographic and economic trends in broad categories
of the labour force. We confine our remarks to aspects strictly relevant to our
main objective.
The most important feature of the demographic-economic trend in Ireland
is illustrated in Diagram 2 which shows (on logarithmic scales) the near eonstm~cy
of the number at work and the great increases in real terms in GDP and GDFCF; in
turn the gradient of increase in gross capital formation is much steeper than for
GDP: capital intensity in Ireland is increasing sharply, though later we shall
have to qualify this conclusion when we consider manufacturing industry.
To analyse the persistence of the trend shown in Diagram 2 the whole period
1960-1978 has been divided into two equal periods of ten years each, i.e., 1960-1969
and 1969-1978, and the rates of change calculated for each as well as for the whole
period, with the following results:-
Annual average percentage changes:
1960-1969 1969-1978 1960-1978
No. at work 0.1 0.5 0.1
GDP 3.6 3.7 3.9
E~DFCF 9.1 4.5 7.0
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Rate of gross capital formation has halved in the later decade while real GDP
has been well maintained at 4 per cent. Trends 1960-1978 are illustrated on
Diagram 2.
Diagram 2
The major chmlge in the job situation since the 1950s has been the
more than halving in the number at work in agriculture as shown in Table 7. A
curious feature of the industrial upsurge that began about 1960 has been its failure
to lower perceptibly the number out of work, even before the present recession.
As already remarked, this persistence of unemployment has been associated with
the lowering of net emigration (which, as we have seen, has changed to net
immigration in recent years).
Table 7
As bearing on the proportion of the population in the labour force,
following are the global percentages by sex, necessarily for census years only:-
Percentages of population age 15-64 in labour force
1951 1961 1966 1971
Males                          92.7 90.4 89.5 87.8
Females 33.5 31.8 32.0 31.2
Married and widowed 8.9 10.0 9.4 11.4
Single 61.9 55.7 58.0 56.2
Total persons 63.8 61.3 61.1 59.8
The percentage of married women in the Irish labour force is the lowest in the EEC.
No doubt this is partly due to larger family cares. However, the rise in the five
years 1966-1971 seems certain to continue. Relative to the declines generally over
the period 1951-1971 are the facts of increased numbers in post-primary schooling and
married women, both classes largely outside the labour force.
With the considerable change in the economy even in real terms over
Largely due to ~he 1974 - 1976 recession.
DIAGI~M 2
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the past half centul~y, in proportionate distribution of numbers at work in the
eight major sectors outside agriculture there has been remarkably little change.
The percentages from 1951 are shown for certain years in Table 8.
Table 8
The fall in the percentage in manufacturing and the rises for public administration
and "ether" (which includes the professions) in the nine years 1971-1980 will be
noted; as also will the similarity of the percentages in 1951 (before the near
revolution of 1960~and 1980, except for the significant rise for public administration.
We now consider the demographic-economic situation in agriculture
and in manufacturing industry in more detail.
Table 9 has been derived from the census tables showing depende~ley
as well as gainfully occupied in each soeio-economic group. In both agriculture
Table 9
and non-agriculture dependency is increasing regularly. The ratio is always greater
in non-agriculture, no doubt due to relatives assisting on farms who are gainfully
occupied.
Agriculture
Table 10 illustrates the amazing chm~ges which have taken place in
European agriculture since 1960. We divided the period 1960-1978 hlto two equal
time periods for the purpose of steadying the persistency of the major trends. The
figures for Ireland are not given in the publication Eurostat: National Accounts
1960-78 (Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1980) which gives data only
for the other six countries shown. Following are principal inferences from the table:-
Table 10
* the magnitude of the changes;
. the enormous decline in the working populations; the persistence of this
decline in the second period, despite
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Table 7: Percentage distribution of the total labour force in major
groups as shown, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1980
1951 1961 1971 1980
At work in -
Agriculture (AFF) 39.3 34.2 24.4 17.8
Non-AFF 57.1 60.7 69.8 76.2
Out of work 3.6 5.0 5.8 6.0
Labour force -
Total number (OO0) 1261.9    1108.1    1119.5     1237
Basic source: Trend of Employment and Unemployment.
Table 8: Percentage distribution of persons at work in eight non-
agricultural sectors, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1980
Sector 1951 1961 1971 1980
Mining, quarrying, turf
Manufacturing industries
Building construction
Electricity, gas, water
Commerce, insurance, finance
Transport, communication, storage
Public administration, defence
Other non-agricultural activity
1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
24.6 26.4 27.3 25.8
11.9 8.9 10.8 10.9
1.3 1.5 1.8 1.5
22.4 23.6 22.0 21.3
8.3 8.1 7.7 7.2
5.5 6.0 6.3 7.6
24.6 " 24.1 22.7 24.4
No. at work (ex. AFF) (000) 729.9     673.0     781.7     943
Basic source: Trend of Employment and Unemployment.
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Table 9: Number of dependents per person gainfully occupied in
agriculture, non-agricuIhlre and iota[ pop.ulation, 1951-1979
Year A gricuiture Non-agriculture Total
1951 1.19 1.42 1.33
1961 1.44 1.60 1.54
1966 1.53 1.60 1.58
1971 1.55 1.70 1.66
1979 1.6e 1.8e 1.76
e: estimated
Basic source: Censuses of Population.
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the vast increase in real value per head, hence prosperity;
Ireland’s real value per head was lowest of the seven’s in 1969 but
was much higher than Italy’s in 1978;
in all seven the changes in kind and to a large extent in degree are similar.
By far the most prosperous agricultural commmlities amongst the seven
were those of Belgium and Netherlands: this did not prevent their having large
and persistent declines hi workers, particularly in the case of Belgium.
Ireland’s percentage decline in number of agricultural workers was
almost the same in the two periods, and these declines were generally less than
those for far more prosperous agricultural populations. Presumably Ireland’s
real agricultural output (added value) per head will continue to increase, to the
point of reaching latest levels of other countries sho~ in Table 10. But such
countries have ex2~erienced even greater percentage declines in number than has
Ireland. We infer that if and when Ireland reaches such levels there is no prospect
of a relaxation in the rate of decline.
The great increase in labour productivity shown by all seven countries
has been due mainly, but not entirely, to declines in working population° In the
case of Ireland the percentage additions in total real added value were 7.2 in 1960-1969
and 35.2 [n 1969-1978; the remarkable increase in the later period, bridging EEC
membership, will be noted, but it should also be noted that income per person in real
terms has fallen by over 50 per cent in 1979 and 1980 with a further decline in 1981,
presaging a more rapid decline in working population.
Manufac tu ring industry
We start our section on manufacturing industry with a citation of
certain results given in Geary and Dempsey (December 1977). Here it was shown
that in 1968, with variable 1 capital per unit labour, 2 earnings per worker, m~d 3 ratio
of numbers of female to male workers:-
r12 = .63 "
r     = -.46
I3
-- -.68
r
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Table .I0: International comparisons of real output and persons engaged in agriculture, 1960-1978
Ireland Belgium France FR Germany Italy Netherlands    United Kingdom
I. No. at work 1978 (000)
2. Percentage change in numbers at work -
1960-1969
1969-1978
1960-1978
3. Added value (£) at constant (1975) prices
per person at work -
1960
1969
1978 _.
4. Percentage change in 3
1960-1969
1969-1978
1960-1978
226 198 1933 1597 2919 284 652
-23.6 -40.2 -30.8 -33.2 -39.6 -26.8 -29.3
-24.2
-37.4 -32.6 -32.9 -25.7 -16.2 -19.9
-42.1 -62.5 -53.3 -55.2 -55.1 -38.7 -43.4
1040 2434 1578 1275 756 2570 1214
1459 4145 2520 2047 1624 4078 2109
2602 6741 4218 3695 2256 6838 3492
40.3 70.3 59.7 60.5 114.8 58.7 73.7
78.3 62.6 67.4 80.5 38.9 67.7 65.6
150.2 177.0 167.3 189.8 198.4 166.1 187.6
b~
Basic sources: Ireland: NIE 1977 and 1978, Other com~tries: Eurostat 1980, National Accounts 1960-78 (Statistical Office of the European
Communities, 1980).
Table II: Job gains and job losses in manufactaring industry, 1973-80
Thousands
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980"
(1) Gross jobs created 21.4 16.7 15.6 20.6 22.1 21.3 23.6 20
11.6 20.0 27.1 18.1 15.9 14.7 14.9 25
9.8 -3.2 -11.5 2.5 6.2 6.6 8.7 -5
210.4 208.6 196.1 201.8 205.5 213.1 221.2 n.a.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Gross job losses
Net change in employment
Employment in December each year
Netincrease in employment in calendar
year (b) 7.3 -1.8    -12.5 5.7 3.7 7.6 8.1 n.a.
* Provisional
Sources: NESC, No.53, Table 16 for 1973-1979; J. Durkan and C. McCarthy (1981) for 1980
Note
For 1973-1979, CSO is the source of (4)(and hence of (5)), IDA of (1), (2) and hence (3).
job losses include job changes,
From method of calculation
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AH cos are significmlt at the NHP = . 001 level The unit is the individual industry
of which there were 22. As regards capital stock, they are based on the estimates
by Henry m~d Scott (1971) which extend only to the year 1968. The cos show that
earnings per worker and capital intensity are closely related; capital-intensive
earnings per worker are lower in female-intensive industriesjas is well known.
However, even with sex ratio constant, the relationship between capita[ and pay
intensity is strong; in fact r12.3 .49, significant at NHP = . 001. When
variable 1 is OLS- regressed on variables 2 and 3 the contribution of variable 3
is insi~n]ificant. On regression of variable 1 on variable 2 it is concluded that an
increase in capital (at 1958 prices) of £i, 000, would result in an increase in earnings
per worker of £79 at 1968 rates.
In the same paper what is described as "utterly unexpected" is the
entire absence of relationship between increase in volume of industrial output
and increased capital intensity. The cos are formally negative (but insignificant)
in the two intervals 1953-1960 m~d 1960-1968.
The relationship between increases of output and employment in
mmmfacklring (44 industries) in four periods were examined in the paper cited
by simple OLS regression of percentage increase in employment on percentage
increase in volume output. The intervals were 1953-1960, 1960-1966, 1966-1973,
1973-1976. The coefficients were all highly significmlt, all near one-half; the
intercepts were all negative but three of the four values were insig~ificant. The
conclusion in the paper is the important one that in mmlufact~ring industry in
Ireland in the period 1960-1973 percentage increase in employment is half percentage
increase in output minus one.
since 1973 (in fact 1973-1979),
We repeated the simple regression for the period
to find: .-
Y = -1.76+ 0.48X, F = 32.8, r=.66,
c (2.93) (5.73)
with notation obvious, While the coefficient of about ½ of percentage increase
in output persists h~ this latest period, the ~tercept is now significantly more
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than unity in absolute value. The relationship in the period 1973-1979 might be:
annual average percentage increase in employment is about one-half percentage
1~ofor ouiput less s
Another result in the paper is that numbering the four periods 1, 2, 3, 4
the variable being the percentage increase in volume of manufacture (44 industries),
the successive ccs are:
r12= .40; r23 =.52;
All are significant at NHP = . 01.
= 48r34 ¯
It is concluded that there is a tendency towards
persistence in time in industrial success (or lack of it).
It would be useful to know the total number of jobs created per extra unit
in manufacturing, a subject much discussed by interested persons. We suggest
that the ascertainment of such figures, with special regard to small towns and
other regional aspects, be made the subject of a special inquiry. In this connecti.on
the trend in the proportion borne by number in manufacturing in the total at work
in non-agriculture has special relevance, {:hough it cannot be argued that, because
the proportion is persistent at about 25 per cent the multiplier is 4’ But, if not,
It would be important to know. The proportion is given for four years
The trend, over 28 years, is shown in Diagram 3.
what is it?
in Table 8.
Diagram 3
Again the regularity of the graph is remarkable. There are few irreg~ular breaks
from year to year. The persistence of 27 per cent for all the years but one from
1962 to 1975 will be noted as well as the continual decline since.
IDA is the source of data for heads (1), (2) and (3) 1973-1979 in Table 11.
Table 11
There is no serious discrepancy between the rows of figures (3) (IDA) and (5)
(CSO), (3) adding to 19.1 in 1973-1979 and (5) adding to 18.1. In these seven
years (1) gross jobs created averaged 20,200 a year mid (2) gross jobs lost
DIAGRAM 3
Number at work in manufacturing as percentage of non - AFF at work, 1953-1980
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1~8,400 so that average annual gain was 1,800. Net job creation has been almost
static with an annaal job turnover of a surprising 8 per cent. The IDA’s success
in aggregate is mainly in the economic field, rather than in net job creation,
though it seems to have had considerable effect in distribution of jobs in manufacturing
$"
to rural areas.
Reference must be made to the marked increase in the capital intensity
in manufacturing industry. Our earlier analysis, for the whole economy it is true,
showed a large increase in real GDFCF (see Diagram 2) with a near constant
labour force. Unfortunately no official estimates are available for fixed asset
investment in Ireland. There are, however, estimates made by R.N. Vaughan
’(1980) for a long series of years up to 1973 for each of about 40 industries and
for total manufacturing industry. In the 20 years 1953 to 1973 net capital stock
at constant (1958)prices per worker increased from £943 to £2,634 or by5
per cent a year with absolute regul.arity. This seemed certain to continue.
Future labour force
Our approach here is to be forecast numbers in the three main
divisions of the labour force, namely number at work in agriculture, in. non-
agriculture and total out of work, in 1991 and 2001. As was remarked earlier
in connection with esthnates of population in these years, we are less concerned
about accuracy than with imparting reality to remarks on policy with which the
paper concludes.
As yet no Irish model of equations worthy of the name is available for
middle term forecasting and authoritative forecasts of individual items are rare:
For a detailed discussion of the’ effect of the IDA on the regional distribution of
employment and income see NESC Reports No 57 (1981) and No 51 (1980).
we shall mention all we know.
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In the absence of a model we rely exclusively
on extrapolation from trends of individual items from 1960 or simple OLS
regressions. We have made several estimates of each of the three variables
mentioned. Many of these were from formulae derived from single s{eps from
1971 to 1979 which, as census years were deemed to afford more accurate
recent data. In other cases trends using all the annual dam from early postwar
census years were used. Grsnted the purpose of the exercises we shall not
be specific about methods of estimation because this might imply justification by
method of estimation: as researchers know to their cost excellence of relationship
-2
during estimation period (high 1% , DW near 2 etc.) is no guarantee of superiority
in forecasting. All we can claim is that the selection of estimates we give in
Table 12 is rational. Our whole approach is based on the fact that, in the past
since 1960 and even before it, it has been shown that, before the present recession
there exist marked regular ities and consistencies at macro demographic and
economic levels and trends, in rates if not in raw data, despite great changes
in detail. Naturally we expect these regularities to persist. Preference in each
set will be based on similarity in forecast rates to those of the past. When in
doubt we shall incline towards the lower forecast for those at work in non-agriculture,
convinced as we are that future growth everywhere will be more in machines than
people. We also have an instinctive preference for figures that show the lesser
change.
Agriculture. There are three esthuates yielding the following as at work:-
Ag 2
Ag 3
1979 1991 2002
(000)
156 118
223 152 112
165 128
When this was written the only detailed study of the near future in Ireland we had
was "Ireland in the Year 2000" (NBST/AFT, 1980) which here we term "Ireland
2000" and which we found useful. Since)there has occurred (in October 1981)
the ESRI Conference on "The Irish Economy and Society in the 1980s", which we
use later.
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Ag 1 is based on all. years 1971-1979, Ag 2 on single step 1960 to 1978, Ag 3
on single step 1971 to 1979. H. O’Neill in Ireland 2000 gives 135,000 for 1991
obviously based on the AFT estimate of 140,000 for 1990. With no great conviction
we set our own at 150,000 for 1991 and 110,000 for 2001.
Non-agriculture.
as follows:
Non-ag
Non-ag
Three future estimates (with official 1979), as at work, are
1979 1991 2001
(000)
1,165 1,501
922 1,191 1,494
1,181 1,452
Non-ag 1 is based on OLS simple regression of persons at work on real GDP
annually 1960-1978. The equation is
.
Non-ag 1 (in thousand) = 501.1 + 0. 2346 GDP (in constant £m)
Non-agricultural GDP at constant (1970) prices for this equation were (with 1978
offic ial figure):-
~m
1978 1,608
1991 2,786
2001 4,261
Non-ag 2 is the sum of estimates for each of the eight major gro~ps, each a single
step extrapolation from 1971 and 1979 data. Non-ag 3 is a single step extrapolation
from the totals for 1971 and 1979. The three sets of estimates are satisfactorily
close together; it is not argued that this fact makes them reliable forecasts but
only that it makes choice easier.
There is, in fact, a conflict in the principal constituent of the non--
agricuItural worlfforce, namely the number at work in manufacturing industry. In
This is not a serious econometric equation, but simply an expression of the
relationship on average between output and employment in non-AFF
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Ireland 2000 P. White estimates this as 420,000 in AD 2000. Our 2001 figure,
a constituent of Non-ag 2, is only 330,000. White’s estimate would be 26 per
cent of the figure he gives of the labour force in AD 2000, namely, 1,600,000,
compared with 21 per cent in 1980. His estimate is based on an annual increase
of 9 per cent in real output of manufacturing, for larger than that obtaining very
steadily over the period 1900-1978, namely 5 per cent. White deduced from his
9 per cent increase in output an almual increase in manpower of 2.8 per cent.
It is interesting that these estimates are consistent with each other in our manpower -
manufacturing output formula since
Percentage increase in manpower - 9 x ½ - 1-~ = 2.75
White’s estimate of labour force at work in 2000 at 1,600,000 is quite near ours,
as will be seen. His estimate of population of 4,100,000 is below our 4, 300,000
in 2001, with migration assumed nil, and birth rate 21.
Oar choice for number of persons at work in non-agriculture is !, 200,000
in 1991 and 1,500,000 in 2001.
Unemployment. This is the most speculative of the three major constituents of the
future labour force but, as a rate, with remarkable constancy in the past (before
the present recession) as will be seen from the last column of Table A1. We
suggest only one set of estimates, that derived from one step extrapolation of
1971-1979, yielding 91,000 in 1991 and 107,000 in 2001 (rounded off to 90,000
and 110,000), compared with 74,000 in 1979. As percentages of the worlfforce
in the years mentioned these numbers, as rates, are
%
1979 6.1
1991 6.3
2001 6.4
So, right or wrong, the esthnates have the virtue of consistency.
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Labour force - a summary.
Summing up, the labour force would be derived as shown in Table 12,
with comparatives for 1971 and 1979.
Table 12
We are conscious of the illogic of the rounding-off in Table 12 in the figures
for 1991 and 2001, also that if they were to be regarded as true forecasts each
of the constituents should have been given as a range. It would be impossible
to cope with ranges so, for arithmetical convenience, we deal with each as a
single figure, however dubious. With similar reserve we shall take total
population (with migration nil) as 3,860, 000 in 1991 and 4,320,000 in 2001,
their birth rate 21 values. Before final acceptance of the labour force estimates
they are related to total population and to population aged 15 or over, with
comparison with years past, as follows:-
Labour force as percentage of population
Year All ages Aged 15 or over
1951 42.6 59.8
1961 39.3 56.5
1966 38.8 55.9
1971 37.6 54.4
1991 37 52.2
2001 40 55.5
While in both series the 1991-2001 percentages are very similar to those for
the census years, the all ages series indicate a reversal of trend, which is to
be hoped for.
Since a figure of 420, 000 has been proposedby IJ. White as the number
in manufacture in 2000, it must be considered. Ii’ in Non-ag 2 it were substituted
for our 330,000, the other constituents remaining the same, total labour force
in 2001 would be 1,820,000. Critical percentages would then be as follows:-
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No. at work in manufacture
as %of -
Non-ag LF
LF    at work
1971 19.1 27.3
1979 19.6 25.9
2001 19 (23) 22 (26)
LF
as %of -
Population
37.6
36.2
40 (42)
(Bracketed figures based on 420,000 at work in manufacture).
The 420,000 is the more consistent in the second (and perhaps most important)
column of percentages, less so in the other two; neither is satisfactory by the
third column test, suggesting that both estimates arc too large. The esthnate
of 420,000 as the number at work in manufacture in 2001 and the adjustment
following from this cannot be ruled out as a possibility in the subsequent analysis.
Table 12: Estimated labour force in its three constituents in 1991 and 2001
with comparative statistics for 1971 and 1979
Thousands
1971 1979 1991 2001
At work
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 273.1
Non-agriculture etc. 781.7
Out of work 64.7
223 150 110
922 1,200 1,500
74 90 110
Labour force 1,119.5     1,219 1,440     1,720
Population 2,978.2     3,368.2 3,860     4,320
In his paper at the ESRI Conference on "The Changing Labour Force"
J.J. Sexton estimates the labour force in 1991 as 1,480,000 or 1,450,000 (rounded
off slightly) on two assumptions with regard to net migration, both small. His method
was based on participation rates applied to population, both classified by age and
sex. These estimates agree excellently with ours of i, 440,000 of Table 12 calculated
quite differently. So indeed does his estimate of population aged 15 or over of
2,750,000 or 2,700,000, our single 2,760,000 in 1991.
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Reconciliation
We now arrive at the crucial point, a main object of this study, of
deciding the likely magnitude of the Irish population problem in the years 1991
and 2001. We conceive this problem to be the reconciliation in those years of
¯ the total of the three magnitudes (i) labour force (ii) number in post primary
education and (iii) number of married and widowed women without a paid job,
with the population assuming migration nil.
Post-primary education. One of the most striking and most regular growth
phenomena in postwar Ireland has been that of numbers in post-primary education.
Average annual growth rates have been as follows:
%p.a.
1951-1961 3.7
1961-1966 4.2
1966-1971 5.4
1971-1979 3.8
Hence to base extrapolation on the 1.971-1979 rate should not appear extravag~’mt.
The increases in 1971.-1979 were due mainly to increases in number aged 15-24,
so extrapolation was based on participation rates (i. e., as fractions of population
aged 15-24), which extrapolated rates were applied to estimated number aged
15-24 in 1991 and 2001 to yield the following estimates for numbers in post-primary
education:-
1991 250,000
2001 290,000
Married and widowed women. Even with three different birth rates (20~ 21, 22) and
two marriage rates (6.0 and 6.5) six hypotheses in all, the difference between
highest and lowest estimates in this group were not great, in fact 710, 000-730,000
for 1991 and 810,000-855,000 for 2001. We decided to assume that the numbers
will be 720,000 and 830,000. But we wish to know the number not gai~ffully occupied
and here we must have recourse to gxtesswork, to a greater extent than anywhere
else. Number of married and widowed women with jobs formed 9, 10, 9 and 11
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per cent of total in the respective census years 1951, 1961, 1966 and 1971, almost
steady, be it noted. We assume that the percentages will be 12 in 1991 and 15
in 2001 giving numbers of married and widowed women not in the labour force of
630,000 and 710,000.
Table 13
Attention is now directed to Table 13, the culminiation of the reconciliation
processas regards the two future years. It will be recalled [hat population on
the one hand and its constituents on the other have been independently estimated,
wJ.thout forcing, so that the success of the process will be determined by the
magnitude of the remainder. While proportionately this is shown in Table 13
to have been declining regularly 1951 to 1971, indeed a very desirable trend,
declines to the 6.9 and 3.2 shown for 1991, and 2001 strain one’ s credibility.
A s to the quality of the forecasts we would have most confidence in the total
population aged 15 or over, then the labour force, albeit with much doubt about
the future numbers of women workers. In our view most doubt must attach
to the figures of married and widowed women, in particular having regard to the
magnitudes involved. We therefore decided to present as Table 14 the male
version of Table 13 for ages 15-64 alone, since additional doubt attaches to
categories for persons aged 65 or over.
Table 14
Almost the steadiest percentages encountered were the proportions
for men in the labour force, namely 74.4, 74.2, 74.1, 74.2 per cent at four
censuses from 1951; so we had no hesitation in adopting 74.2 per cent for
estimating future number of men in the labour force as shown in Table 14. At
the three censuses to 1971 the percentages male (of total males and females)
j n education were also steady at 51.8, 52.0, 51.4 per cent; futures were set
at 52 per cent. We notice that the proportions for the remainders at about 4
per cent are now perfectly consistent.
Table 13: Population aged 15 or over in and out of the labour force in certain broad categories,
numbers and percentage distributions, 1951 to 2001
Category
1951 1961 1966 1971 1991 2001
Thousand
Labour force
Not in labour force
In fulltime postprhnary education
Married and widowed women
1258.8 1096,3 1109.4 1114.1 1440 1720
846.9 844.8 874,2 932.9 1320 1380
56.7 79.7 102.2 136.8 250 290
257.5 227.9 211.2 207.6 190 I00
Total population aged 15 or over 2105.8 1941.1     1983.6 2047.1 2760 3100
Percen~ge
Labour force
Not in labour force
In fulltime pos tprirnary education
Married and widowed women
Remainder of population
59.8 56.5 55.9 54.4 52.2 55.5
40.2 43.5 44.1 45.6 47.8 44.5
2.7 4.1 5.2 6.7 9.1 9.4
25.3 27.7 28.3 28.7 31.9 31.9
12.3 11.7 10.7 i0. I 6.9 3.2
Co
Table 14: Male population aged 15-64 in labour force ~ud out in certain broad categories, numbers and percentage
" distributions
Category 1951 1961 1966 1971 1991 2001
Thousand
Labour force
Not in labour force
In full-time post-primary education
Rema~der of population
848.6 739.7 751.5 762.9 1040 1180
66.5 78.8 88.2 106.4 180 210
20.7 41.3 53.1 70.9 130 150
45.8 37.5 35.1 35.5 50 60
Total male population aged 15-64 915.1 818.5 839.7 869.3 1220 1390
Percentage
Labour force
Not in labour force
In full-time pos t-primary educa tion
Remainder of population
92.7 90.4 89.5 87.8 85.2 84.8
7.3 9.6 10.5 12.2 14.8 15.1
2.3 5.0 6.3 8.2 10.7 10.8
5.0 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.3
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The figures for 1991 in Table 14 are based on linear interpolations
of the 1971 and 2001 figures as the remainder from a formal calculation was in
our opinion implausible. The 1040, 000 agrees reasonably with J.J. Sexton’s
ESRI Conference (1981)figures of 990,000 or 1010, 000 (rounded off).
The four or five per cent in the remainder in Table 14 are mainly for
those not yet at work or incapacitated. The percentage for females aged 15-64
is very much larger and. requires a little analysis which may be confined to
census actualitie s :-
Females aged 15-64
1951 1961 1966 1971
Thou sand
Population                 874.3 807.5 820.9 848.0
Remainder 129.0 132.3 110.9 97.3
If male % applied 4.3.7 37.1 34.5 34.. 8
Rest 85.3 95.2 76.4. 62.5
The figures were as follows for males aged 15-64:-
000 %
Labour force 960 79.3
Not gainfully occupied 250 20.6
In fulI-time education 130 10.7
Remainder of population 120 9.9
Total male population aged 15-64 1210 i00. -
If the 1991 remainder here were anything like right, it might be
interpreted as the labour force being larger than shown but through increased
unemployment in Ireland, or the population being smaller through emigration.
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The idea in the third row is to eliminate invalids and women seeking first
jobs (though the purely speculative figures are probably exaggerations,
as for females). The "rest" are single females aged 15-64 most of whom
would be described on the census form as engaged in home duties. The
number has declined sharply since 1961 and indications are of still lower
figures in 1991 and 2001.
Summary and conclusions with some reflections on costs
We shall now attempt a summary of, and a conclusion
from, this treatment of futures. The population m~d its main constituents
have been estimated separately for the years 1991 and 2001. Any discrepancy
in the reconciliation should appear in the remainder; if this were too large
the Iikelihood might be that normal unemployment (i.e., in the labour force)
or emigration should have increased; a remainder too small might suggest
a welcome lowering of the unemployment level in the labour force, or
immigration. The figures for the year 2001, especially in Table 14 for
men, show that with normal development (I. e., at the general rate obtaining
from about 1960 to before the present recession), including unemployment
as in the past, the estimated population of some 4.3 million could be realised
without net emigration.
Normality always implies an unemployment rate of 6
per cent of labour force, which policy will be directed towards reducing.
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It is unnecessary to state that, as a result of the present depression., the
timing for the future is wrong. We have no notion how many years it ~vtll take
to shed the effects of the depression. The few economic futures we estimate
will not be realised by 1991 or 2001. The timing scenario may be better as
regards population, our main concern; as emphasised more thml once, our
principal objective is not forecasting but policy in its broadest lines as it
directly affects population.
~olicy implications,, Points which have impressed us most so far in our analysis,
as relevant to population outlook and policy:-
® the likelihood tlaat Ireland’s birth ,rod fertility rates will eon.tinue to be large
by European standards, with obvious implications for policy on education, attitude
to emigration etc. ;
the enormous decline in the agricultural population is likely to continue;
¯ as hi the past, the population level in future will be conditioned by an improved
stmxdard of living, i.e., as measured by real inconle per head;
the likelihood of the continuation of Ireland’s endemically high unemployment
rate;
¯ the great increase in capital intensity in industry;
unmarried women without paid jobs are numerous and likely to remain so in
future, if with diminution in number.
Mention of these findings goes near to defining problems and policy
in regard to them. We must bear in mind in the reflections that follow that the
main constraint on wise action is cost, about which some remarks follow.
In our treatment the few economic statistics we use are those we
deem closely related to population. There are many others, inflation,
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foreign trade etc., well known as regards level and trend and their problems. The
problems we deal with are education and trsining, agriculture, employment and
unemployment, all interrelated of course.
Education in our unoriginal view is the most important activity for its effect
on the country’s future. A. D. Tussing (1978) has shown that, in 1974 annual
costs per pupil or student were £91 at primary, £211 at Secondary and £512 at
third level at 1970 prices. These figures do not reflect the relative importance of
the three levels, since the most important level is the primary as affecting all
future citizens and as essential preparation for those children moving to higher
levels of education and training. The best teaching skills should be deployed at
primary level. As rapidly as possible the national pupil-teacher ratio should be
reduced to 30 at most - in 1979 it was 32, declining commendably, if slowly, from
.
36 in 1971. May we make a plea for the addition of S - speaking to the three Rs
and to establish proficiency in RRRS as overwhelmingly the most useful for boys
and girls at any level, for, with proficiency in these, all else may be added?
We shall not assume a censorious tone about Irish education and trairdng,
for that is not how we feel about it. Organisationally it is excellent and we have
noted the vast and continuous increase in numbers in post-primary levels, also the
recent creation of institutions like AnCO, and the special third level colleges, all
with emphasis on technical and away from purely academic subjects. Most experts
seem agreed, however, that Irish education is still over-academic.
We are aware that there has been considerable research in Irish
education (in which, indeed, we have ourselves participated in statistical aspects)
and we have no pretention here to give anything like a summary of this but only
refer to a few points bearing on our main topic. In our reading about education
in Europe generally we have noted the observation that development in education
Average figures however, give a misleading impression of actual pupil-teacher ratios.
In 1978/79 66% of ordinary national school classes hkd in excess of 30 pupils per class,
this accounting for 75% of all pupils. Thus to reduce all class sizes to below 40
pupils would, on a formal calculation, require the hiring of not more than 3,300
teachers. (This presumes that there is no scope for the redistribution of pupils
among classes with below 40 pupils in size). Doubt has lately been expressed as to
the validity of the use of this ratio as a measure of efficiency in education (see
Kellaghan m~d Martin, cited in Irish Times, June 4, 1981).
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has proceeded according to education’s own ideas and rules which are regarded
as somewhat out of line with rapid economic and social changes generally. We do
not know how true this is of Ireland; we express only our conviction that education
should be a preparation for life, with special emphasis on working life.
The National Manpower Service of the Department of Labour rightly
pays great attention to the problem of school leavers. While the Survey Team of
the Investment in Education Reports (1965 and 1966) found that of the 17,500 national
school pupils who left full-time education in 1962-63, no fewer than roughly 9,000
or 53 per cent left without having completed fifth standard; though the Team
remarked that these figures were exaggereated, none created more alarm in the
Reports. Happily the situation has vastly hnproved since that thne.
The latest available information of the position of school leavers
is from the 1980 National Manpower Services survey of school leavers. It yields
the following figures:-
Position of 1978/79 leavers from second-level schools in May of 1980
Status No.
(000)
Employed 43.4
Unemployed (after
loss of job) 1.8
Seeking first job 3.1
Student 12.8
Unavailable for work 1.5
Emigrated 1.4
Total 64.1
Source: N1VIS, Survey of School Leavers (1980)
Note
%
68.0
2.8
4.8
19.9
2.3
2.2
100.0
This survey, carried out in May 1980, reveals a reasonably satisfactory situation
for young people, with 7.6 per cent out of work as, against a national average of
6.0 per cent in April 1980, and 88 per cent in jobs or further education about a
year after leaving school. It is interesting to note the breakdown of those seeking
work by the level at which they left school. Of those who left with no qualifications
19 per cent were seeking employment; wi~h Inter Cert/Group Cert 9 per cent; and
Leaving Cert 5 per cent. This finding suggests positive returns in terms of
employment for additional years at school.
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We have already remarked that the worst feature of Irish emigration
in the past was the lack of skills amongst emigrants, which destined them for
the lowest jobs in the countries of immigration. If the present birth rate is
maintained there is a reasonable probability that movement will be sizeable
again. If so, it is essential that movers be well trained and generally well
prepared before leaving. Movement between jobs should become normal amongst
Europeans and further abroad, as good for individuals and hence good for the
nation which is a collection of individuals. The word "emigrant" with its
unfortunate historical trail of association should be dropped from the language.
There is great trctth in. the adage "T ravel improves the mind", particularly
relevant to jobs. Work abroad should be preferred to long-term unemployment
at home.
,
In 1978 public expenditure in 1978 prices on education in its major
categories, current and capital was as follows:
Level £m.
First 130
Second 1.53
Third 41
Total 324
It has been estimated that reduction of the pupil-teacher ratio to 40 at first
level would increase the public cost of first level edtlcation by £10m in 1978 prices
which we would regard as small compared to the benefit derived. Future costs
(at constant 1975 prices) with present day actual are as follows:
Year Public expenditure,
on education
£m as % of GDP
1978 184 5.6
1991 460 7.2
2001 830 8.6
Private expenditure on education was £78m in 1978.
**
D. O’Mahony, cited in Irish Times, June 4, 1981.
We may appear to have devoted undue attention to education. We would
resist this in our conviction that the future wellbeing of the nation depends mainly
on the right kind of education.
Agriculture. As another value judgement we deplore the vast decline in numbers
at work in agriculture, which decline seems certain to continue, while recogntstng
that young people leaving the land probably improve their income in real terms
and leave more per head for those who stay.
untrained for urban employment problem s.
Insofar as these leavers are
IDA has been fairly sucees~ul in
its policy of directing factories to rural areas, so improving the rural population
situation but there are obvious constraints on this policy.
We consider that a hnost the worst defect in the market economy we
practice in the West is that it precludes us from feeding that hungry billion (in a
world population of some four billion) because they can’t pay. Of course it is not
suggested that action should consist only in sending food to the hungry; it should be
mahHy in helping them to produce their own food, thus creating much work in many
home industries. Instead, under stress of CAP and administered agricultural
prices we have periodical mountains of this product or that. One would hope that
major future policy of the West would be directed towards elimination of world
hunger, some of which is at home and the need extends to more than foodstuffs.
In Ireland such policy might result in retaining more workforce on farms.
.Employment and tmemplo~nent. Little attention has been given to the Costa
Dempsey, Geary (1977) thesis that the economic process will never suffice to
absorb the long-term unemployed, that a Special Works Programme (SW1°) under
the NMS (to become an Authority) be set up directly to put the unemployed to work
while reeogntstng that the autonomous working of the economic system would be
far the better solution. These findings were influenced by the doleful prediction of
the European COMET model that (with estimation period 1954-1971) the Irish
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unemployment rate in 1980 would be by far the worst in EEC . Of course all these
gloomy prognostications imply unchanged conditions in future and are designed in
fact to persuade authority. It was pointed out by Costa, Dempsey, Geary that,
were it not for the huge unemployment rate in the two or three great unskilled
groups, numbering some one-eighth of the labour force, endemically with 20
per cent out of work, Ireland could not be said to have an unemployment problem
at all. In the year 1970-71 some 2,000 boys entered these occupations; while most
of these subsequently improved their situation, too many remained. It follows,
almost syllogistically, that more young people should receive higher education and
training to reduce the too large labour pool of unskilled. It was argued that trained
people can always get jobs.
Costa estimated that at 1977 prices and allowing for saving on unemployment
payment, all the unemployed could be set to work voluntarily for less than £100 million
a year, which is not much these days.
The too many young people’s going to unskilled jobs must be largely due
to their coming from impoverished homes, thus perpetuating poverty. To ensure
that everyone capable of benefiting from higher education and training receives it,
educational subsidies to poor families should compensate not only for cost of
education but for income of families lost by its young people’s not going out towork.
It has been argued that expenditure on education is essentially investment
in the individual; in fact there is reason to think, by reference to differential lifetime
incomes that this investment has a very high yield. In recognition of this fact there
has recently been recourse to the practice of borrowing to cover the cost of higher
Happily the rate, given as 16.5 per cent,
cond itions.
has not been realised even under recession
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education, to be repaid in instalments out of the reciplent’s future earnings.
We consider this to be an excellent practice worthy of extension to all socio-economic
classes but only if the rates of interest payable are well below their present
usurious levels, perhaps with the help of subsidy.
We are well aware of the faults of personal subsidies. Geary
(1973) showed that, in relation to national income, level of social security
payments [n Ireland were highest in EEC. There is a real hazard of social
security becoming a way of life, B.M. Walsh (1978) showed that there is a positive
relationship between increase in average length of sojourn on the Live Register
and increase in social security payment and J.G. Hughes ~_981) has lately shown
that persons [11 at any time in 1979 constituted 12 per cent of the worldoree,
compared with 6.6 per cent in 1954 and that ill and tmemployed together in
March 1979 numbered more than a quarter of the total worlfforce. These facts are
di squietlng.
Geary and IIughes (1970),t0 obviate the humiliating sense
of rejection by society on the part of long-term unemployed, suggested that all
workers should be endowed with a civil service type contract. Perhaps the need
for it was exaggerated in the sense of a wide measure of acceptance of unemployment
as a normal social condition with income payments at near present levels. It would
be a pity if this were tile case.
We have shown that single women engaged in home duties are
numerous and little imaginative effort is needed to realise that their condition must
be unsatisfactory. To a certain extent this is recognised by their being granted
a pension at the age of 58, but this is not nearly enough. We suggest that realistic
payments be granted to single women of all ages who are looking after elderly
incapacitated people. We are unaware that this problem hag ever received specific
attention, and as our least recommendation we suggest it should now be examined.
Cbs ts
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There is
implications which inevitably involve public expenditure.
is almost the only deterrent against social amelioration.
not much point in a paper like this without mention of policy
The financial constraint
Results recently derived
from MODEL-80 (Bradley, Digby, Fitzgerald, Keegan, Kirwan), shown in Table 15,
have relevance to this whole inquiry.
Table 15
It will be seen that public expenditure in both its modes has exacerbat{ng
effects on two of our most serious national problems, the balance of payments and
government borrowing. It isalmost unbelievable that one million pounds’ expenditure
should in the base year (0) cause a worsening of the balance of payments of about
the same amount, while the situation in this regard improved by the fifth year.
Public borrowing was also very large but is mitigated to some extent by increased
revenue. Real GNP rises by about a £million. While the unemployment diminution
effect is considerable in base year (0) by the second mode of expenditure it is
curious that this improvement turns into an increase of 57 in unemployment in the
fifth year. In general, however, the employment effects are small.
We have made proposals for expenditure on setting a large number of
the unemployed directly to work, possibly increased expenditure on education (since
the suggestion that to an extent higher education should be paid for by its recipients
themselves is unlikely to be accepted) and increased social security payments to
many umnarried wom.en with dependents engaged on home duties. All these payments
would come from the public purse with proportionate effect like those shown in Table 15.
We should add in regard to the second mode of expenditure that increased public
employment in the model is described as in "public administration". We are not
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Table 15: Effect on specified variables of a £ million increase in public
expenditure at constant (1975) prices on 1 current expenditure on goods
mid services (excluding public employment)and 2 public employment
Values in £m.
Specified variable
1. Balance of payments (export excess)
2. Personal consumer expenditure
3. Employment, non-agricultural
4. Public borrowing
5. Public expenditure, current
6. Public revenue, current
7. Labour force
8. Non-agricultural profit
9. Unemployment
10. GNP (1975 prices)
Effect of increase of £1m in public expenditure
l.Excl, pub. emp.
Year 0 Year 5
-0.98 -0.57
0.38 0.35
39 46
i. 07 0.94
i. 28 I. 45
0.21 0.51
18 47
1.02 1.09
-21 1
1.08 1.09
2. Pub. emp:
Year 0 Year 5
¯-0.86 -0.71
0.29 0.48
271 118
0.55 0.62
1.00 1.31
0.45 0.69
125 174
-0.27 -0.16
-146 57
i. 03 i. 20
Source:
Units:
Bradley, Digby, Fitzgerald, Keegan, Kirwml (1981)
number for 3, 7, 9, rest £m (at 1975 prices)
Note
MODEL-80 has 266 endogenous variables (mid hence 266 equations) with 130 exogenous
variables and I00 behavioral equations, hence 166 identities. The system is non-linear
and was solved by single equation OLS regression. The estimation period was mmmal
using data from 1960 to 1977. The effect shown are cumulative through six years 0-5.
The first two columns represent the effect of ml increase of £1m. in the exovar specified.
The last two columns are effects achieved through the intermediary of m~ expenditure of
£1m on an endovar public authorities net current expenditure calculated to produce 237
employment in public administration, ml exovar.
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sure that the type of employment contemplated in Costa, Dempsey, Geary (1977)
largely of unemployed whose normal occupation is unskilled would come under this
head; if not we suggest the model should provide a separate heading: or a sub-model
constructed with this problem central to it. Table 16 discourages any form of public
expenditure, however worthy its motive. Or is basic reform of Irish public finances
the real need, especially in the determination of priorities ? Has public financial
policy been the principal cause of the dangerous rapid increases in balance of payments
and national debt ? The MODEL-80 showing works both ways; perhaps the best
policy for reducing these would be by a corresponding reduction in public spending
to repeat with close regard to priorities, and sacrifice progressively distributed.
The main finding is that during the next 20 years the endemic unemployment rate of
about 6 per cent of the labour force will not be reduced without emigration. This
conclusion, like most others in the paper, is tentative and may be changed by events,
including changed plans. We emphasize the supreme importance of education. We
hope that the statistics displayed and the suggestions therefrom will promote
continuous discussion, consideration and planning modification as required.
Table AI: Demographic statistics,
APPEXDIX
real GNP per head and unemp[oyment rate, 1946-1979
Population Birth Death Marriage Emig-ration
Year (000) rate rate rate r~t¢
1946 2957 23.0 14.0 5.9 7.3
1947 2974 23.2 14.8 5.5 2.7
!948 2985 22.1 12.2 5.4 6.2
1949 2981 21.5 12.8 5.4 10.1
1950 2969 21.4 12.7 5.4 12.7
1951 2960.6 21.2 14.3 5.4 9.8
1952 2953 21.9 11.9 5.4 12.6
1953 2°~t9 21.2 11.7 5.4 10. 8
1954 2941 21.3 12.1 5.4 11.9
1955 2921 21. i 12.6 5. 6 15.4
!956 2898 21.0 11.7 5.8 17.2
1957 2885 21.2 11.9 5. I 13.8
1958 2853 20. 9 12.0 5.3 20.0
1959 2846 21.1 12.0 5.4 11.6
1960 2832 21.4 11.5 5.5 14.9
1961 2818.3 21.2 12.3 5.4 13.8
1962 2830 21.8 12.0 5.5 5.7
1963 2850 22.2 11.9 5.5 3.3
1964 2864 22.4 ii. 4 5.6 6.1
1965 2876 22.1 II. 5 5.9 6.4
1966 2884.0 21.6 12.2 5.8 6.6
1967 2900 21.1 I0.8 6.1 4.8
1968 2913 20. 9 11.4 6.5 5.1
1969 2926 21.5 11.5 6.9 5.5
1970 2950 21.8 11.4 7.0 2.3
1971 2978.2 22.7 10.7 7.4 2, 5
1972 3024 22.7 11.4 7.4 -3.9
1973 3072 22.4 11.1 7.4 -4.4
1974 3123 22.1 _II. 2 7.3 -5.4
1975 3176 21.2 10.4 6.7 -6.0
1976 3226 21.0 10.6 6.4 -5. i
1977 3269 20.9 10.2 6.0 -2.4
1978 3311 21. i !0.0 6, 3 -1.6
1979 3368.2 21.5 9.7 6.2 -5.2
GNP per head
(1970 prices)
N.A.
289
303
319
322
328
338
348
353
362
361
364
362
383
399
421
43O
443
466
473
476
496
527
548
559
571
596
6O8
619
524
618
643
674
N.A.
Out of work as
% labour force
3.6
5.3
5.3
5.1
5.3
6.7
6.4
6.1
5.6
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.7
4.6
4.7
5.0
5.3
5.0
5.8
5.8
6.3
5.9
5.7
6.4
7.0
7.6
6.9
6.1
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